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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates the rationales of exclusive dealing (ED), which is one of the most 
common forms of vertical restraint and attracts intense policy debates in anti-trust regulations. 
Based on a survey of the theoretical literature, we derive several hypotheses relative to the anti- and 
pro-competitive motivations of ED. These hypotheses are submitted to French data regarding 
several types of distribution networks in a wide range of sectors. Considering the industry features, 
our empirical analysis indicates that in the French distribution system, ED contracts tend to be pro-
competitive. The evidence suggests that the motivation of ED mainly lies in its positive role to 
foster the investment of upstream firms.  
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1. Introduction 
 
As one of the most common forms of vertical restraint and as a prevalent device in franchising 
networks, exclusive dealing (ED) has been attracting the attention of industry players and 
competition policy authorities for decades (Lafontaine and Slade, 2012).Vertical restraints are 
contractual provisions imposed by a producer to constrain the action of one or several retailers. ED 
clauses, as components of contracts between manufacturers and distributors, require the purchase 
of products or services exclusively from only one supplier for a period of time. These agreements 
prohibit the distributor from carrying the products of rival manufacturers. 
The regulations in the United States (US) and in the European Union (EU) were traditionally 
hostile to these restrictions and were viewed with suspicion. This position has evolved over time. 
Currently, the French legal environment regarding vertical restraints is defined by the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Article 101(1) of the Treaty prohibits agreements 
that prevent, restrict or distort competition. However, agreements that create sufficient benefits to 
outweigh the anti-competitive effects are exempt from this prohibition under Article 101(3) of the 
TFEU. In addition, the European Commission has adopted the Block Exemption Regulation 
(BER) on vertical restraints, which entered into force on June 2010 and will remain in force until 
May 2022 (Regulation (EU) No 330/2010). This regulation provides a safe environment for most 
vertical agreements, including ED. It renders, by block exemption, the prohibition of Article 101(1) 
of the TFEU inapplicable to vertical agreements that fulfil certain requirements. Franchising is not 
specifically mentioned in the regulation itself, but is dealt with in the guidelines on vertical restraints 
(SEC (2010) 411). These guidelines describe the approach taken towards vertical agreements not 
addressed by the BER. In particular, the BER does not apply if the market share of the supplier 
and/or buyer exceeds 30 %. However, exceeding the market share threshold of 30 % does not 
create a presumption of illegality as this threshold serves only to distinguish those agreements that 
benefit from a presumption of legality from those that require an individual examination2.  
Indeed, as for the other vertical restraints, the anti-trust effects of ED are complex and appear as 
a main controversial issue in the courts and among economists. For example, studying the ED case 
of Ticketmaster in Ireland, Gorecki (2006) uses two distinct methods. In so doing, he arrives at 
opposite conclusions on the abuse of a dominant position of the company. For this reason, most 
economists consider that the rule of reason approach is better than a per se prohibition and should 
be generalised, as it allows assessing for each case if the pro-competitive impacts of the contract are 
                                                
2The guidelines assist firms in carrying out such an examination. 
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likely to outweigh the exclusionary effects. 
The traditional argument regarding ED considers foreclosure as the main anti-competitive effect 
of such vertical restraint, when it allows a dominant firm to deter an efficient entry (Marvel, 
1982;Ater, 2010; Nurski and Verboven, 2011; Hiller, 2012). However, this argument is challenged 
by the potential efficiency gains, as ED may be a relevant solution to upstream and downstream 
free-riding problems and opportunistic behaviours (Besanko and Perry, 1993;Heide et al., 1998; 
Asker, 2004 and 2005; Sass, 2005; Chia-Wen, 2013). 
Despite an extensive analysis of such exclusionary contracts in the theoretical field, the empirical 
literature on ED is limited. 
As emphasised by Lafontaine and Slade (2008), most studies focus on a single industry. 
Examples include beer retailing (Slade, 2000 and 2011; Asker, 2004 and 2005; Sass, 2005; Klick and 
Wright, 2008; Wen 2013), car market (Brenkers and Verboven, 2006; Nurski and Verboven, 
2011),video rental industry(Mortimer, 2008), hamburger chain market (Ater, 2010), and live music 
industry (Hiller, 2012).This body of literature investigates the outcomes of the exclusionary clauses 
with respect to prices(Slade, 2000; Sass, 2005), costs (Asker, 2004; Brenkers and Verboven, 2006), 
profits (Mortimer,2008), market-shares (Nurski and Verboven, 2011; Wen 2013), and sales and 
consumption (Sass, 2005; Klick and Wright, 2008; Ater, 2010).These papers use various 
econometric methods including cross-sectional data (e.g., Sass, 2005), panel data (e.g., Slade, 2000; 
Mortimer, 2008; Hiller, 2012), reduced form models (e.g., Wen 2013) or structural models (e.g., 
Asker, 2004; Brenkers and Verboven, 2006). 
However, there has been little focus to date on the motivations for ED contracts. 
The work of Heide et al. (1998) provides some insight into the rationales of ED. Studying the 
industrial machinery-equipment, electronics and electric equipment sectors, the authors use primary 
data to estimate a binomial logit model regarding the choice to include an exclusionary clause in the 
contract. The paper focuses on the determinants of E rather than on the impact of such 
agreements. The ex ante assessments by the managers are taken into account as explanatory 
variables. These assessments concern the free-riding on manufacturer services, the transaction 
costs, the cost imposed on the customers due to the exclusionary clause, the manufacturer 
differentiation, and the likelihood of competitive entry. The authors find evidence that the 
manufacturers who care more about their promotional efforts, training, or general support from 
distributors are more likely to use ED clauses. 
This key empirical result is consistent with the efficiency theories of ED. More particularly, Segal 
and Whinston (2000b) emphasise the impact of the nature of the investments made in the vertical 
relationships, thus distinguishing several categories of investments with varied influences regarding 
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the exclusionary contracts. 
Our paper is set in the research field initiated by Heide et al. (1998) and takes into account the 
theoretical developments since this initial article. While most of the evidence concerns the 
consequences of ED, we study the empirical rationales of this vertical restraint. 
More precisely, this paper reviews the recent development of the theoretical literature that 
provides explanations of the strategic, anti-competitive motives of ED and the pro-competitive 
motives of ED in promoting efficient enhancing investment, following the typology of Segal and 
Whinston (2000b). In doing so, we identify the industrial determinants that may affect the choice 
for ED agreements and derive testable hypotheses from the theoretical framework. These 
hypotheses are then submitted to French primary data regarding a wide range of sectors. Our 
empirical results provide insights into the anti-trust regulation of ED contracts in the European 
context. 
In contrast with the existing empirical literature, this paper addresses several sectors and several 
types of distribution networks, thus allowing us to compare the market structures that affect directly 
the motivations for ED. In addition, taking into account the potential endogeneity bias, we control 
for the influence of the presence of other vertical restraints in the contract - exclusive territories and 
tying - on the choice to use ED. This is specific to our study as is the control for the potential 
impact of the geographical location of the suppliers. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical background and derives the 
testable hypotheses. Section 3 provides specifications regarding the French distribution system, the 
sample and the study variables. Section 4 contains the estimations, and concluding comments are 
presented in section 5. 
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2. Theoretical Motivations and Hypotheses 
 
 
2.1. Likelihood of exclusive dealing and anti-competitive motives 
 
Background 
 
 
The rationales of ED have been extensively discussed in the theoretical literature. The Chicago 
School critique, led by Bork (1978) and Posner (1976), notes that the motive for an exclusive 
contract is mainly because of efficiency. To induce downstream buyers to sign ED contracts, the 
upstream incumbent firm must compensate the downstream buyers with at least the same rent that 
entrant can offer. That is, if the entrant were more efficient, the incumbent would not find it 
profitable to pay buyers not to trade with the entrant. As a result, if the incumbent succeeds in 
concluding an ED contract with buyers, it is basically because the incumbent is more efficient. 
The Chicago School critique, however, is being challenged. Over the last two decades, increasing 
attention has been paid to the strategic motives of ED. Although it is widely accepted that ED may 
have anti-competitive effects, the existing literature provides different rationales under various 
economic environments. Rasmusen et al. (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000a) argue that if the 
entrant firm has to trade with a sufficient number of buyers to achieve scale economy, the 
incumbent monopolist may opt to use exclusive contracts to deter efficient entry. The intuition of 
such “naked exclusion” is mainly due to contract externality: if the incumbent has buyers to sign the 
exclusive contract, the purchase of remaining buyers may not be sufficient to cover the minimum 
efficient scale of the entrant, and hence, entry will not occur. To this extent, the signed buyers exert 
a negative externality on other buyers, thus facilitating the incumbent to use a divide-and-conquer 
strategy to deter efficient entry.  
Contract externality is also exploited in Innes and Sexton (1994), where the buyer has the choice 
to sign a contract and obtain vertical profit with the entry; in Berheim and Whinston (1998), where 
buyers are independent in different markets and the entrant is viable only if it serves in all the 
markets; and in Karlinger and Motta (2013), where a product has value only if enough buyers 
purchase. 
Another stream of literature, pioneered by Aghion and Bolton (1987), investigates “partial E”. In 
their framework, the buyer is allowed to breach the exclusive contract and pay damage 
compensation to the incumbent. In this way, the incumbent can extract some of the surplus created 
by the efficient entrant by accommodating entry. Similar results are derived by Spier and Whinston 
(1995), who generalise Aghion and Bolton’s model in the context of a renegotiated contract.  
The literature discussed above provides useful insights on the rationales of ED. However, these 
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papers generally assume that the buyers at the downstream level are either final consumers or 
independent retailers and that the upstream market contains only an incumbent and a potential 
entrant, whereas in the real world economy, both the upstream and downstream competition matter 
in the designing of vertical contracts. A volume of recent literature focuses on these aspects. 
 
 
Upstream competition  
 
A few papers investigate the effect of upstream competition on the possibility of signing an 
exclusive contract. In a framework where the incumbent seller can merge with the potential entrant, 
Fumagalli et al. (2009) suggest that if the buyer expects weak competition from the entrant, he will 
be willing to accept exclusivity behind a small compensation, and therefore, ED may occur. In a 
setting where the incumbent faces multiple potential entrants, Kitamura (2010) argues that the anti-
competitive ED is more likely to be observed in industries with few alternative factor inputs, 
products and technologies. 
Based on these results, in which strategic ED is more likely to occur when the upstream 
competition is weak, we derive the following testable hypothesis: 
 
 
H1 – The more concentrated the upstream market, the more likely it is that the upstream incumbents sign ED 
contracts for anti-competitive purposes. 
 
 
Downstream competition  
 
With respect to downstream competition, current analyses reach different conclusions. Fumagalli 
and Motta distinguish two channels that intensify the downstream competition: the number of 
downstream firms and the degree of substitution of the final products. In Fumagalli and Motta 
(2006), exclusion is less likely to occur in case of fierce Bertrand-like downstream competition. 
Likewise, Fumagalli and Motta (2008) show that the larger number of downstream buyers, the more 
difficult it is for them to coordinate, and hence, the easier it is for the upstream incumbent to 
exploit contract externality and foreclose the efficient entrant. 
In this framework, and considering the number of firms as a measure of the degree of 
downstream competition, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H2a –The larger the number of downstream units, the more likely it is that the upstream incumbents sign ED 
contracts for anti-competitive purposes. 
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With respect to product substitution, Fumagalli and Motta (2008) demonstrate that if the 
downstream competition stems from the substitution of products, a buyer can obtain greater profit 
by switching to an efficient entrant who offers a competitive wholesale price. Hence, the incumbent 
cannot profitably foreclose the entrant. As a result, the intense downstream competition based on 
the substitution of products makes strategic ED less likely. This argument is, however, challenged 
by the recent analysis that argues that Fumagalli and Motta’s (2008) framework is based on a strong 
assumption that the downstream buyers can be inactive under fierce Bertrand-like competition. 
Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) find that if buyers are allowed to break the contract and pay 
expected damage to the incumbent (as in the Aghion and Bolton framework), ED is more likely to 
occur if downstream competition becomes intense. The reason for this is that the downstream 
buyers, although in competition, always remain active in the market. When entry occurs, the intense 
inter- and intra-brand competition eliminates almost all the vertical profit. As a result, it is easier for 
the incumbent to sign an exclusive contract with the buyer to foreclose the entrant and obtain 
monopoly profits of the industry. Similar results are found in Abito and Wright (2008), Wright 
(2009) and Gratz and Reisinger (2013). 
With respect to the degree of substitution, we follow the argument of Simpson and 
Wickelgren(2007), Abito and Wright (2008), Wright (2009) and Gratz and Reisinger (2013) to derive 
the following hypothesis: 
 
 
H2b–The more substitutable the final products are, the more likely it is that the upstream incumbents sign ED 
contracts for anti-competitive purposes. 
 
 
The literature and the embodied rationales for strategic ED contracts can be summarised as 
follows (Table 1): 
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Table 1 -Anti-competitive motives for exclusive dealing 
 
 
Industry Structure References 
 
Results Basic Rationales 
 
 
Basic structure: 
Upstream 
incumbent 
and entrant 
competing for 
independent 
downstream buyers 
Rasmusen et al. (1991), 
Segal and Whinston 
(2002a), Innes and 
Sexton (1994), Berheim 
and Whinston (1998), 
Karlinger and Motta 
(2013) 
 
Naked ED: incumbent can 
block efficient entrant using 
ED contract. 
If buyers cannot coordinate and entry requires 
enough buyers to purchase, there is contract 
externality of ED that prevents entry. 
Agion and Bolton (1987), 
Spier and Whinston 
(1995) 
Partial ED: incumbent signs 
ED and entry occurs. 
Incumbent can extract some rent from efficient 
entrant through the contract-breach 
compensation stipulated in the ED contract. 
 
 
Upstream 
competition 
or coordination 
 
Fumagalli et al.(2009) 
Kiamura (2010) 
H1: The more concentrated 
the upstream market, the 
more likely that the 
upstream incumbents sign 
ED contracts.  
 
Intensive upstream competition gives buyers 
more outside options, making it difficult to 
accept. 
 
Downstream 
competition 
stemming from 
number of firms 
and product 
substitution  
Fumagalli and Motta 
(2006), Fumagalli and 
Motta (2008) 
H2a: The larger the number 
of downstream units, the 
more likely that the 
upstream incumbents sign 
ED contracts.  
 
A large number of downstream buyers make 
it difficult for them to coordinate; hence, 
ED is easier to achieve. 
Harsh downstream competition. 
Simpson and Wickelgren 
(2007), Abito and Wright 
(2008), Wright (2008), 
Gratz and Reisinger 
(2013) 
H2b: The more 
substitutable the final 
products, the more likely 
that the upstream 
incumbents sign ED 
contracts. 
 
The intense inter- and intra-brand competition 
reduces the potential rent that entrants can offer 
to buyers, and hence, it is easier to accept ED.  
 
 
 
2.2 Exclusive dealing and investment incentives 
 
Background 
 
The literature highlighting the efficiency aspects of ED mainly focuses on the strong link 
between exclusionary provisions and the beneficiary’s investment incentive. The conventional 
perspective in this field recognises that exclusive contracts can be used to protect the investment of 
a party in the vertical relationship and that, as a result, they can foster such an investment (see, for 
example, Marvel 1982, Fransco 1991, Mastern and Snyder 1993 for informal discussion). This 
notion has been exploited in Besanko and Perry (1993), who argue that an ED contract can be used 
to prevent the free-ride of the competitors on non-relationship-specific investments. In fact, under 
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ED, an investment becomes specific to the vertical relationship, and hence, it eliminates the inter-
brand externality among retailers. 
Segal and Whinston (2000b) analyse the relationship between investment and ED in a more 
general framework. Unlike the conventional perspective, these authors argue that whether ED 
fosters investment depends on who invests in the vertical relationship and on the nature of the 
investment. In particular, if the investment is complementary, in that it increases the value of trade 
between the entrant and buyers, then ED fosters the investment of the incumbent seller while 
reducing the investment incentive of downstream buyers. On the other hand, if the investment is 
substitutable, in that it reduces the trade value for the entrant and the buyers, ED reduces the 
incumbent seller’s investment but increases the investment of downstream buyers. As the 
investment only affects the internal trade value of contractually locking parties, ED is irrelevant for 
these parties’ investment decisions. 
Following the work of Segal and Whinston (2000b), a number of papers challenge the 
irrelevance result of ED. Che and Sakovics (2004) argue that the irrelevance result does not hold in 
a dynamic model in which the timing of investments and bargaining is endogenous. Meza and 
Selvaggi (2007) suggest that ED can increase the recipient’s bargaining power, thus enabling such 
power to extract an increased share of the surplus created by its investment. However, de Fontenay 
et al. (2010) generalise the model of Segal and Whinston and find that their irrelevance results still 
hold in their setting. Fumagalli et al. (2012) argue that because ED affects the investment incentive 
depends on the investment cost, the irrelevance result holds if the investment cost is small. 
However, ED promotes investment and forecloses entry if the investment cost is large.  
 
Upstream investment 
 
Thus, the literature shows that there is no general conclusion on the linkage between ED and 
investment, in particular, for the internal, relation-specific investment and that the work of Segal 
and Whinston (2000b) remains central. For this reason, we base our hypotheses on this key 
reference with the aim being to study whether the theory still holds in the real world economy. 
Accordingly, we derive the following hypotheses regarding the upstream investments: 
 
H3a –In the presence of upstream complementary investments, it is more likely that the upstream incumbents sign 
ED contracts for efficiency purpose. 
 
 
H3b –In the presence of upstream substitutable investments, it is less likely that the upstream incumbents sign 
ED contracts. 
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Downstream investment 
 
In addition, the following testable propositions can be considered regarding the downstream 
investments: 
 
 
H4a – In the presence of downstream complementary investments, it is less likely that the upstream incumbents 
sign ED contracts. 
 
 
 
H4b – In the presence of downstream substitutable investments, it is more likely that the upstream incumbents 
sign ED contracts for anti-competitive purposes. 
 
 
 
The economic rationales of pro-competitive efficient ED are summarised in Table 2: 
 
 
 
Table 2 - ED and investment incentives 
 
Reference                           
Segal and Whinston (2000b) 
Upstream incumbent invests Downstream retailers invests 
Hypotheses Basic Rationales Hypotheses Basic Rationales 
 
Complementary investments: 
benefit the trade between 
competitors and retailers 
H3a:  
Efficient ED is 
more likely. 
ED can protect 
the investment of 
incumbent from 
the free-ride of 
competitors. 
H4a: 
Anti-competitive 
ED is less likely. 
ED reduces the incentive of 
retailer to invest in favour 
of the competing sellers 
and, hence, can help the 
incumbent to dampen the 
position of competitors. 
 
Substitutable investments: 
reduce the trade between 
competitors and retailers 
H3b:  
ED is less likely.  
Incumbent has 
incentive to invest 
and dampen the 
position of its 
competitors. ED is 
of no use. 
H4b: 
Anti-competitive 
ED is more likely. 
ED gives the retailer more 
incentive to invest as it 
dampens the position of 
competitors to the benefit 
of trading with the 
incumbent. 
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3. Empirical Specifications 
 
 
3.1 The French system 
 
The French distribution system is characterised by a diversity of organisational forms. The two 
main organisational forms are company-owned chains, where the outlets belong to the upstream 
firm or to one of its subsidiaries, and franchised networks, where the upstream firm transmits its 
business format and monitors the independent downstream units to maintain the brand’s 
reputation. 
Other types of governance forms in the French system include (i) retailer cooperatives, where 
the upstream unit in charge of the promotion of the common brand belongs to the retailers; (ii) 
brand licensed networks, which are similar to business format franchises, but less constraining for 
the downstream units; (iii) concession networks, which are similar to traditional franchises; and (iv) 
commission-based affiliations (CBA), which are similar to business-format franchises but more 
constraining as the stock shares at the downstream level are owned by the upstream firm. 
Each of these networks may choose to include an ED clause in the vertical contracts. Notably, 
as mentioned by Lafontaine and Slade (2013), the European legal environment provides franchisors 
great flexibility to impose or rely on ED.  
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 The sample 
 
Between 2006 and 2008, the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies 
(INSEE) conducted several surveys to collect information regarding the distribution networks over 
seven units. The networks, and more precisely, the upstream units (i.e., the head-ends), were 
surveyed through a questionnaire distributed by postal mailing. 
The original dataset used in this study compiles primary data produced by the INSEE. This 
dataset is exhaustive and covers all retail sectors. As a result of matching and of the retropolation of 
the data, our cross-sectional dataset refers to the year 2007. 
The sample consists of 504 networks of independent retailers using the same brand name. 
As presented in Table 3, seven types of networks are distinguished in the sample. More than half 
of the networks (53 %) use the same type of vertical contract with all of their outlets. The other 
networks mix several types of relationships. In the sample, each network is allocated a type 
according to the share of the network turnover achieved by each type of outlet. The algorithm 
successively tests the condition in the second column of Table3 and stops when a condition is 
deemed true. 
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Three types of franchised networks are distinguished to consider the presence of integrated retail 
outlets that are owned and directly operated by the upstream firm for each franchised network. 
These three categories of franchised networks include franchised and slightly mixed with owned 
retail units, franchised and highly mixed with owned retail units, and predominantly integrated 
network.  
 
Table 3: Seven types of distribution networks (INSEE definition) 
 
Network type 
 
Condition 
Franchised slightly mixed More than 50 % of the network turnover (NT) is achieved by franchised units 
Franchised highly mixed  Between 20 % and 50 % of the NTis achieved by franchised units 
Predominantly integrated More than 50 % of the NTis achieved by company-owned outlets  
Brand License More than 50 % of the NTis achieved by outlets with a brand license contract 
Commission-based affiliation More than 50 % of the NTis achieved by outlets with a CBA contract 
Concession More than 50 % of the NTis achieved by outlets with a concession contract 
Cooperative More than 50 % of the NTis achieved by outlets whose members belong to a 
cooperative 
 
 
The sample covers a wide range of activities grouped into 15 sectors according to the INSEE 
classification. The sector-based distribution of the sample networks is presented in Table 4. This 
table shows that the two main sectors are « Clothing retail » (20.24 % of sample networks) and 
« Home equipment » (19.05 % of sample networks). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Sector-based distribution of the sample networks 
 
 Number of 
networks 
% in sample 
 
Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and automotive equipment trade 16 3.17 
Retailing predominantly in food supermarkets 5 0.99 
Retailing general supply or frozen products in small stores 9 1.79 
Equipment for individuals 51 10.12 
Culture-leisure-sports 46 9.13 
Home equipment 96 19.05 
Development of housing 46 9.13 
Non-food, non-specialised retail stores 5 0.99 
Craft businesses 15 3.63 
Trade and repair of motorcycles 5 0.99 
Retail sale of food in specialised stores 29 5.75 
Retail sale of medical and orthopaedic devices 11 2.18 
Other retail stores specialising in non-food items 45 8.93 
Clothing retail 102 20.24 
Retail shoes 23 4.56 
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3.3 Distribution of the ED clause 
 
Tables 3 to 5 present the distribution of the ED clause in the sample networks (Table 5), within 
the 15 sectors (Table 6), and within the network types (Table 7).  The precise question in the survey 
questionnaire reflects the possible duty of the independent retailers in the network. This question is 
as follows: “Do you impose on your retailers an ED with the network central purchasing unit or 
with referenced suppliers?” The possible responses are “yes” or “no”. 
As highlighted in Tables 3 to 5, the distribution of the ED clause is quite balanced in the sample 
(46.43 of the sample networks use ED), within the retail sectors, and within the network types. 
However, its prevalence in the sectors “Retail sale of food in specialised stores” (69 %) and 
“Clothing retail” (67 %) with respect to the organisational forms “Predominantly integrated” (68 %) 
and “Commission-based Affiliation” (70.6 %) are evident. 
 
Table 5: Distribution of the ED clause in the sample networks 
 
 Freq % 
No- ED 270 53.57 
ED 234 46.43 
Total 504 100 
 
 
Table 6: Distribution of the ED clause within the 15 sectors 
Sectors No-ED ED Total 
Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and automotive equipment trade  11 5 16 
Retailing predominantly in food supermarkets  4 1 5 
Retailing general supply or frozen products in small stores 3 6 9 
Equipment for individuals 30 21 51 
Culture-leisure-sports 31 15 46 
Home equipment 49 47 96 
Development of housing 36 10 46 
Non-food, non-specialised retail stores 5 0 5 
Craft businesses 8 7 15 
Trade and repair of motorcycles 4 1 5 
Retail sale of food in specialised stores 9 20 29 
Retail sale of medical and orthopaedic devices 7 4 11 
Other retail stores specialising in non-food items 28 17 45 
Clothing retail 34 68 102 
Retail shoes 11 12 23 
Total 270 234 504 
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Table 7: Distribution of the ED clause within the network types 
 
Network type No-ED ED Total 
Brand license 31 11 42 
Concession 23 16 39 
Franchised and slightly mixed 71 47 118 
Franchised and highly mixed 21 27 48 
Predominantly integrated 47 102 149 
Cooperative 72 19 91 
Commission-based affiliation 5 12 17 
Total 270 234 504 
 
 
3.4 The study variables 
 
The study variables are presented in Table 6. The dependent variable is a dummy denoting the 
presence of an ED clause in the vertical contract. The core explanatory variables derived from the 
analytical framework relate to the upstream and downstream competition levels and to the upstream 
and downstream investments. In addition, we add several control variables. 
 
Upstream competition  
 
 
The market concentration is measured in four ways. First, we use the market share of the network, 
defined as the network turnover divided by the sector turnover. Each of the 15 sectors in the 
dataset relates to a market where the upstream firms compete. Second, we calculate the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI) for these markets. Third, we take into account the interaction between the 
market share and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index with a multiplicative variable (Market share * 
HHI). Finally, we consider the size of the market segment, i.e., the number of networks for each 
segment. Again, we use the INSEE nomenclature for this complementary and finer classification of 
activities and distinguish 25 segments in the sample. 
 
Downstream competition  
 
 
The features of the downstream competition are related to the number of downstream units and 
to the type of product, more or less substitutable. 
We measure the number of downstream units for each network (size of the network) and for each 
market (size of the market, which is 15 markets). A multiplicative variable cannot be introduced due to 
multicolinearity problems. 
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In addition, two types of products are distinguished: substitutable and non-substitutable. Substitutable 
products are characterised by automatic, high frequency purchases such that no substitutable 
products involve well-thought-out purchasing decisions or higher research costs for consumers. 
Such a proxy variable was previously used by Brickley (1999). Table 8 presents the sector 
distribution used to construct the dummy variable: substitutable or non-substitutable. 
 
Table 8: Construction of the dummy variable: substitute 
 
Sector Type of product 
Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and sale of motor vehicle parts and accessories non-substitutable 
Large-scale food retailing stores substitutable 
Retailing general supply or frozen products in small stores substitutable 
Personal and household goods (except clothes and shoes) non-substitutable 
Cultural and recreation goods stores non-substitutable 
Home equipment stores non-substitutable 
Development of housing substitutable 
Retail non-food non-specialised stores substitutable 
Craft businesses non-substitutable 
Trade and repair of motorcycles non-substitutable 
Retail sale of food in specialised stores non-substitutable 
Retail sale of medical and orthopaedic non-substitutable 
Other retail stores specialising in non-food substitutable 
Clothes stores substitutable 
Shoe stores substitutable 
 
 
 
Upstream investment 
 
 
With respect to investments that benefit the trade between the upstream competitors and the 
downstream units, upstream complementary investments are closely related to the initial training 
provided by the upstream unit to the downstream firms and to the transmission of expertise by the 
upstream structure to the downstream units. 
In contrast, upstream substitutable investments have a negative impact on the trade between the 
upstream competitors and the downstream units. We construct an index of the upstream 
substitutable investment with seven variables related to the functions possibly performed by the 
upstream firm in the vertical relationship: the definition of the assortment of the stores, logistics 
functions (storage, warehousing, delivery to retail outlets), the definition of the services provided to 
the consumers, the tracking of sales, the diffusion in the network of the performances regarding the 
outlets sales, invitations to be part of the strategic commissions of the network (marketing, 
communication, etc.), the help to transmit the outlet. In the dataset provided by the INSEE, each 
of these variables is taken into account as a dummy. Our index is defined as the sum of these seven 
dummy variables. The higher the index is, the more substitutable the upstream investment. 
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Downstream investment 
 
 
The downstream complementary investment refers to the efforts exerted or investments made 
by the retailers in favour of the trade with the upstream competitors. Such investment is measured 
as the services provided by the network outlets to the final consumers, such as advice, or by 
demonstration sessions. 
With respect to the downstream substitutable investments, which impede trade with the 
upstream competitors, we use an index constructed with four dummy variables regarding the 
investment of the downstream units in the vertical relationships: the payment of an entrance fee or 
the subscription of shares, the payment of fixed contributions, the payment of royalties related to 
the turnover of the outlet, and the financial participation in advertising campaigns. 
 
Control variables 
 
 
We add ten control variables. First, considering that the network experience may influence the 
contractual design, we control for the impact of the age of the network and the impact of an upstream 
unit of another branded network on the choice to use ED. 
Second, because it is relevant to study each contractual provision as part of a whole, we control 
for the influence of other vertical restraints included in the contract on the decision to use ED. As 
mentioned by Slade (2008), vertical restraints are often analysed in isolation, whereas theory 
demonstrates that they can be substitutes or complements. Aiming at controlling for such 
relationships, we consider the presence of an exclusive territory clause granted to the downstream 
units, as well as the presence of tying imposed on the downstream units. However, this issue may 
raise endogeneity problems, which are taken into account. 
Third, we control for the influence of the type of network, taking into account the distinction 
among the seven distribution networks in the French system (see Table 1). The aim is to study the 
potential impact of the organisational form on the contractual design. For example, as argued by 
Innes and Sexton (1994), if the downstream buyers can vertically integrate with the upstream 
entrant, ED is generally efficient as it deters inefficient entry. Hence, the organisational form may 
also be an important factor affecting ED. Finally, we add dummies regarding the geographical location 
of the upstream structure, which is new in the empirical literature on ED. This original perspective 
enables us to take into account three main types of structural determinants that may affect the 
individual choice to include ED in distribution contracts: the geographical dimension, the industrial 
features that comprise the market structure, and the network organisational form. Five locations are 
considered: the area of the capital city, the north-eastern part of the country, the north-western part 
of the country, the south-eastern part of the country, and the south-western part of the country.  
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Table 9. Summary statistics (504 distribution networks) 
 
 
 
Variables 
 
Definition  
 
Mean         Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
 
Type 
Dependent variable 
ED Exclusive dealing clause included in the vertical contract .4642857    .4992184          0          1 Dummy variable 
Explanatory variables derived from the hypotheses 
MARKETSHARE Market share of the network (network turnover/market turnover) .0297619    .0698682   .0000693   .6048392 Quantitative variable 
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschmann index 9.615324    8.760991   3.146751   44.62323 Quantitative variable 
MARKSHARHHI Market share * HHI (multiplicative) .0029568     .004568    .000017   .0312769 Quantitative variable 
SIZESEGMENT Size of market segment (number of networks) 39.19841    35.14079        1        102 Quantitative variable 
SIZENET Size of network (number of downstream outlets)  180.004    488.4781          7       7770 Quantitative variable 
SIZEMARKET Size of market  (number of downstream outlets) 9689.278    5098.248       227      16402 Quantitative variable 
SUBSTITUTE Type of product: substitutable versus non-substitutable .5337302    .4993566          0          1 Dummy variable 
INITRAIN Initial training provided by upstream to downstream units .7777778    .4161528          0          1 Dummy variable 
TRANSF Transmission of expertise by upstream to downstream units .8214286    .3833736          0          1 Dummy variable 
SERVICE Services provided by downstream units to final consumers .4801587    .5001025          0          1 Dummy variable 
UPSUBSTI Upstream substitutable investment 8.234127    2.823634          0         13 Index summing 7 dummies 
DOWNSUBSTI Downstream substitutable investment 2.236111    1.221822          0          4 Index summing 4 dummies 
Control variables 
AGE Age of network 21.31092    19.81727          0        184 Quantitative variable 
OTHERNET Operation of upstream unit of another branded network 1.333333    .9437458          0          2 Dummy variable 
EXCLUTERRI Exclusive territory granted to downstream unit .7142857    .4522028          0          1 Dummy variables for the 
impact of another restraint TYING Tying imposed on downstream unit .6468254    .4784313          0          1 
TYPENET Type of network (7 organisational forms distinguished) 3.119048    1.614335          0          6 Qualitative variable 
CAPITALCITY Area of capital city .4146825    .4931566          0          1  
Dummy variables for the 
geographical location of the 
upstream unit 
NORTHEAST Northeast area of country .1190476    .3241663          0          1   
NORTHWEST Northwest area of country .156746    .3639224            0          1 
SOUTHEAST Southeast area of country .1845238    .3882962          0          1 
SOUTHWEST Southwest area of country .125            .3310475          0          1 
 
Dummy variables (0/1): 0 = no; 1 = yes 
Dummy variables (0-2) used to construct UPSUBSTI: 0 = no;    1 = yes partially;   2 = yes completely 
Dummy variable (0-2) OTHERNET: 0 = yes; 2 = no 
Dummy variables (0/1) SUBSTITUTE: 0 = substitutable; 1 = non-substitutable 
 
18 
 
 
4. Empirical Determinants of Exclusive Dealing 
 
4.1 Specification tests 
 
The Breusch-Pagan test is performed and allows concluding for heteroscedasticity. 
Accordingly, the standard errors are corrected using White's method. 
The low values of the variance inflation factors suggest that there is no multicolinearity 
problem (see Appendix 1), while the Pearson chi-square tests, which are applied to determine 
whether a relationship exists between the categorical variables, highlight a dependence between 
OTHERNET and TYING (critical probability 3 : Pr = 0.035), between OTHERNET and 
TYPENET (critical probability: Pr = 0.000), between EXCLUTERRI and TYING (critical 
probability: Pr = 0.007), between EXCLUTERRI and TYPENET (critical probability: Pr = 
0.020), between TYING and TYPENET (critical probability: Pr = 0.000). Accordingly, we 
provide estimates using a step-by-step econometric approach and introduce these regressors 
gradually (Table 11). In addition, we introduce the estimation of models including these variables 
simultaneously (Table 10). 
 
 
4.2 Estimation results 
 
Table 10. Probit estimates for exclusive dealing 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
AGE -0.00112 -0.00190 -0.00167 -0.00226 -0.00239 
 (0.00338) (0.00344) (0.00356) (0.00338) (0.00342) 
      
OTHERNET 0.132* 0.144* 0.147* 0.229** 0.224** 
 (0.0660) (0.0667) (0.0682) (0.0744) (0.0751) 
      
EXCLUTERRI 0.510*** 0.513*** 0.560*** 0.373* 0.404** 
 (0.137) (0.139) (0.142) (0.156) (0.155) 
      
TYING 0.784*** 0.799*** 0.784*** 0.562*** 0.566*** 
 (0.130) (0.131) (0.134) (0.147) (0.150) 
      
TYPENET 0.0735 0.0699 0.0738 0.0756 0.0826 
 (0.0385) (0.0386) (0.0417) (0.0475) (0.0474) 
      
CAPITALCITY 0.292* 0.273* 0.332* 0.407**  
 (0.126) (0.129) (0.135) (0.148)  
      
MARKETSHARE  -0.266 -1.070 -0.461 -0.119 
  (1.380) (1.379) (1.402) (1.407) 
      
HHI  -0.00683 0.0114 0.00659 0.00557 
                                                
3The null hypothesis H0 is the hypothesis of independence. 
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  (0.00915) (0.0125) (0.0138) (0.0138) 
      
MARKSHARHHI  21.54 35.92 31.09 25.92 
  (19.70) (20.99) (22.84) (22.87) 
      
SIZENET   -0.0000986 -0.0000357 -0.0000366 
   (0.000157) (0.000179) (0.000178) 
      
SIZEMARKET   -0.0000424 -0.0000436 -0.0000484 
   (0.0000264) (0.0000285) (0.0000288) 
      
SIZESEGMENT   0.0145*** 0.0142*** 0.0153*** 
   (0.00353) (0.00379) (0.00383) 
      
SUBSTITUTE   0.287 0.394* 0.422* 
   (0.171) (0.185) (0.186) 
      
INITRAIN    0.569** 0.563** 
    (0.212) (0.216) 
      
TRANSF    0.716** 0.727** 
    (0.245) (0.243) 
      
SERVICE    0.137 0.134 
    (0.142) (0.142) 
      
UPSUBSTI    0.126*** 0.126*** 
    (0.0287) (0.0296) 
      
DOWNSUBSTI    -0.0996 -0.102 
    (0.0619) (0.0626) 
      
SOUTHEAST     -0.396* 
     (0.192) 
      
SOUTHWEST     -0.225 
     (0.231) 
      
NORTHEAST     -0.205 
     (0.218) 
      
NORTHWEST     -0.763*** 
     (0.212) 
      
_cons -1.475*** -1.462*** -2.031*** -3.872*** -3.492*** 
 (0.220) (0.251) (0.357) (0.467) (0.487) 
 
Prob> chi2        
Pseudo R2   % 
Predicted 
0.0000 
0.1130 
68.28 
0.0000    
0.1175      
67.23 
0.0000    
0.1531      
69.12 
0.0000    
0.2635      
73.95 % 
0.0000    
0.2728      
74.79 % 
Area under ROC curve 0.8222 0.8270 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001 
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Table 11. Step-by-step probit estimates for exclusive dealing 
 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
      
AGE -0.00167 -0.00180 -0.00206 -0.00244 -0.00218 
 (0.00328) (0.00329) (0.00327) (0.00336) (0.00330) 
      
OTHERNET 0.263*** 0.256***    
 (0.0727) (0.0730)    
      
EXCLUTERRI  0.371* 0.392**   
  (0.153) (0.151)   
      
TYING    0.628***  
    (0.146)  
      
TYPENET     0.0774 
     (0.0457) 
      
MARKETSHARE 0.232 0.124 0.131 -0.00398 0.266 
 (1.424) (1.427) (1.459) (1.445) (1.451) 
      
HHI 0.00530 0.00823 0.00751 0.00373 0.00222 
 (0.0139) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0136) (0.0138) 
      
MARKSHARHHI 11.96 18.22 15.19 20.03 5.563 
 (21.58) (21.62) (20.70) (21.10) (20.66) 
      
SIZENET -0.0000466 -0.0000742 -0.000105 -0.0000472 -0.0000517 
 (0.000134) (0.000156) (0.000150) (0.000138) (0.000130) 
      
SIZEMARKET -0.0000432 -0.0000392 -0.0000338 -0.0000373 -0.0000451 
 (0.000028) (0.000028) (0.000027) (0.000027) (0.000027) 
      
SIZESEGMENT 0.0152*** 0.0148*** 0.0135*** 0.0134*** 0.0145*** 
 (0.00372) (0.00371) (0.00368) (0.00374) (0.00369) 
      
SUBSTITUTE 0.415* 0.386* 0.324 0.304 0.428* 
 (0.176) (0.177) (0.175) (0.178) (0.177) 
      
INITRAIN 0.659** 0.609** 0.586** 0.545* 0.680** 
 (0.214) (0.213) (0.210) (0.214) (0.215) 
      
TRANSF 0.793** 0.709** 0.646** 0.712** 0.759** 
 (0.244) (0.247) (0.250) (0.238) (0.246) 
      
SERVICE 0.268* 0.240 0.200 0.128 0.223 
 (0.137) (0.138) (0.137) (0.139) (0.135) 
      
UPSUBSTI 0.131*** 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.126*** 0.122*** 
 (0.0284) (0.0284) (0.0279) (0.0281) (0.0284) 
      
DOWNSUBSTI -0.0647 -0.0788 -0.108 -0.100 -0.110 
 (0.0618) (0.0631) (0.0622) (0.0601) (0.0605) 
      
SOUTHEAST -0.356 -0.392* -0.353 -0.342 -0.295 
 (0.188) (0.191) (0.192) (0.190) (0.188) 
      
SOUTHWEST -0.375 -0.365 -0.367 -0.278 -0.332 
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 (0.223) (0.226) (0.224) (0.226) (0.224) 
      
NORTHEAST -0.129 -0.135 -0.133 -0.252 -0.0796 
 (0.211) (0.213) (0.207) (0.211) (0.206) 
      
NORTHWEST -0.720*** -0.760*** -0.787*** -0.760*** -0.716*** 
 (0.204) (0.204) (0.200) (0.207) (0.202) 
      
cons -2.961*** -3.142*** -2.594*** -2.588*** -2.561*** 
 (0.450) (0.457) (0.431) (0.427) (0.431) 
 
Prob> chi2         
Pseudo R2   % 
Predicted 
0.0000 
0.2385 
74.16 
0.0000    
0.2464      
72.27 
0.0000    
0.2271      
71.22 
0.0000    
0.2451      
73.11 
0.0000    
0.2220      
72.69 
Area under ROC curve    0.8080 0.8140 0.8038 0.8132 0.8000 
 
Standard errors in brackets 
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001 
 
CAPITALCITY is the reference for the location of the upstream unit.  
The results are robust and qualitatively similar to those of another reference. 
 
These estimates enable us, first, to comment on the quality of the econometric models. The 
good global significance of the models is highlighted by the pseudo R-squared, which is quite 
high for cross-sectional data (between 0.11 and 0.27), by the chi-square probabilities, which are 
systematically equal to 0, by the percentage predicted (between 68.28 and 74.16), and by the area 
under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve (between 0.80 and 0.82). 
The comparison of the estimated models shows that the results are robust. 
Regarding the control variables, the results suggest that the age of the network and the type of 
network have no influence on the decision to impose ED. The probability for ED is higher when 
the upstream unit operates a single-branded network. This result supports the argument of 
Besanco and Perry (1993), in which an ED contract can be used to eliminate the inter-brand 
externality of the upstream firms when the inter-brand competition is strong. Interesting results 
are obtained concerning the impact of the other vertical restraints (exclusive territory, tying) and 
of the geographical location of the upstream structure (head-ends) such that the probability for 
ED is higher when the vertical contract encloses other vertical restraints. In addition, the results 
highlight the influence of geographical features. More precisely, the probability for ED is higher 
when the upstream unit is located in the area of the capital city (models 1 to 4). Furthermore, 
when using CAPITALCITY as the reference, the probability for ED is lower when the upstream 
unit of the network is located in the northwest of France. 
The core explanatory variables are first concerned with the upstream competition. While the 
market share of the network, the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index, and the interaction of these two 
variables have no influence on the decision to ED, the size of the market segment exerts a 
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significant positive influence. 
Regarding downstream competition, the number of retail units has no significant influence 
regarding the intra-brand downstream competition (SIZENET) or the intra- and inter-brand 
competition (SIZEMARKET). However, the results suggest that the type of product affects the 
choice for ED (SUBSTITUTE), even if the sign is the reverse of that which is predicted. 
Finally, estimates dealing with investment issues highlight the relationship between the 
upstream investments, either complementary or substitutable, and ED. In all cases (INITRAIN, 
TRANSF, UPSUBSTI), the sign is positive, that is, it is the reverse of the prediction concerning 
the upstream substitutable investments. On the other hand, we do not find evidence regarding 
the influence of downstream investments on ED. 
 
 
4.3 Endogeneity and robustness checks 
 
Endogeneity problems can be suspected regarding the variables OTHERNET, 
EXCLUTERRI, TYING, TYPENET, DOWNSTREAMSI compared to other vertical restraints 
(EXCLUTERRI, TYING, DOWNSTREAMSI) or to strategic choices of the upstream unit 
(OTHERNET, TYPENET). 
For this reason, we perform Hausman tests comparing probit and bivariate probit models 
fitted to binary endogenous regressors. The results show that it is not possible to conclude for 
endogeneity regarding OTHERNET (critical probability4: Prob>chi2 = 0.2485), EXCLUTERRI 
(critical probability: Prob>chi2 = 0.2925), TYPENET(critical probability: Prob>chi2 = 0.2951) 
or DOWNSTREAMSI (critical probability: Prob>chi2 = 0.2016). 
A low risk of endogeneity is highlighted regarding TYING (critical probability: Prob>chi2 = 
0.0946). For this reason, we provide the estimation results of bivariate probit models (11 and 12) 
and seemingly unrelated bivariate probit models with sector dummies (13 and14), thus 
controlling for the potential endogeneity of this variable (Table 12). The estimates are 
qualitatively similar to the other estimation results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
4The null hypothesis H0 is the hypothesis of exogeneity. 
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Table 12. Bivariate probit and seemingly unrelated bivariate probit estimates for exclusive dealing 
(potential endogeneity of TYING) 
 
 (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Dependent variable: ED    
SOUTHEAST -0.295  -0.337  
 (0.182)  (0.183)  
     
SOUTHWEST -0.356  -0.284  
 (0.204)  (0.220)  
     
NORTHEAST -0.139  -0.238  
 (0.198)  (0.222)  
     
NORTHWEST -0.772***  -0.728***  
 (0.194)  (0.219)  
     
CAPITALCITY  0.384**  0.387** 
  (0.133)  (0.142) 
     
MARKETSHARE -0.313 -0.627 0.0935 -0.152 
 (1.397) (1.413) (1.517) (1.462) 
     
HHI 0.00682 0.00796 0.00273 0.00323 
 (0.0125) (0.0124) (0.0137) (0.0135) 
     
MARKSHARHHI 10.42 16.30 18.91 22.44 
 (20.24) (20.51) (21.96) (21.26) 
     
SIZESEGMENT 0.0132*** 0.0123*** 0.0124** 0.0109** 
 (0.00361) (0.00357) (0.00422) (0.00410) 
     
SIZENET -0.000105 -0.000108 -0.0000460 -0.0000489 
 (0.000146) (0.000152) (0.000180) (0.000178) 
     
SIZEMARKET -0.0000331 -0.0000286 -0.0000348 -0.0000301 
 (0.0000263) (0.0000262) (0.0000273) (0.0000269) 
     
SUBSTITUTE 0.334 0.305 0.253 0.206 
 (0.171) (0.169) (0.197) (0.191) 
     
INITRAIN 0.484* 0.501** 0.537** 0.535** 
 (0.194) (0.189) (0.206) (0.203) 
     
TRANSF 0.675** 0.672** 0.709** 0.685** 
 (0.227) (0.227) (0.232) (0.227) 
     
SERVICE 0.222 0.235 0.148 0.160 
 (0.129) (0.128) (0.141) (0.136) 
     
UPSUBSTI 0.141*** 0.139*** 0.123*** 0.119*** 
 (0.0264) (0.0258) (0.0290) (0.0290) 
     
DOWNSUBSTI -0.0696 -0.0687 -0.0980 -0.0959 
 (0.0577) (0.0571) (0.0600) (0.0591) 
     
AGE   -0.00271 -0.00264 
   (0.00330) (0.00323) 
     
TYING   0.975 1.142* 
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   (0.574) (0.491) 
     
_cons -2.401*** -2.806*** -2.731*** -3.166*** 
 (0.397) (0.388) (0.471) (0.426) 
 
 
Dependent variable: TYING    
Similar independent variables and 
equations for ED 
 
yes yes no no 
Sector dummies no no yes yes 
 
Prob>chi2      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Standard errors in brackets 
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001 
 
 
Finally, the inclusion of sector dummies in the probit models allows checking for the 
robustness of the results, which are, again, qualitatively similar, with the exception of the variable 
SUBSTITUTE, as highlighted in Table 13. 
 
 
Table 13. Probit estimates for exclusive dealing with sector dummies 
 
 (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
      
AGE -0.000561 -0.000591 -0.000357 0.000115 -0.000576 
 (0.00382) (0.00388) (0.00393) (0.00383) (0.00387) 
      
OTHERNET 0.244** 0.233**    
 (0.0768) (0.0772)    
      
EXCLUTERRI  0.416* 0.444**   
  (0.165) (0.163)   
      
TYING    0.581***  
    (0.154)  
      
TYPENET     0.0527 
     (0.0480) 
      
CAPITALCITY 0.343* 0.369* 0.355* 0.348* 0.307* 
 (0.148) (0.151) (0.150) (0.151) (0.147) 
      
SIZESEGMENT 0.00433 0.00162 -0.00172 0.00105 0.00127 
 (0.00667) (0.00673) (0.00648) (0.00660) (0.00646) 
      
SUBSTITUTE 0.241 0.148 0.286 0.186 0.472 
 (0.424) (0.416) (0.402) (0.412) (0.418) 
      
INITRAIN 0.745*** 0.695*** 0.677** 0.648** 0.750*** 
 (0.209) (0.211) (0.210) (0.210) (0.210) 
      
TRANSF 0.822*** 0.723** 0.679** 0.738** 0.797*** 
 (0.238) (0.245) (0.246) (0.236) (0.236) 
      
SERVICE 0.329* 0.308* 0.269 0.157 0.283* 
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 (0.139) (0.140) (0.138) (0.143) (0.137) 
      
UPSUBSTI 0.118*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.117*** 0.113*** 
 (0.0287) (0.0288) (0.0283) (0.0285) (0.0286) 
      
DOWNSUBSTI 0.0110 -0.000151 -0.0245 -0.0131 -0.0256 
 (0.0651) (0.0657) (0.0641) (0.0629) (0.0636) 
      
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
 
 
Prob> chi2      
Pseudo R2 
% Predicted 
 
0.0000  
0.2594 
73.94 
0.0000    
0.2688      
72.88 
0.0000    
0.2549      
74.15 
0.0000    
0.2663      
72.46 
0.0000    
0.2457      
73.52 
Area under ROC curve    0.8181 0.8243 0.8208 0.8227 0.8116 
 
Standard errors in brackets 
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001 
 
Models with sector dummies do not include HHI indexes. 
 
 
 
4.4 Interpretation of the results 
 
Summary comments are provided concerning the testable predictions subjected to data for 
analysis. 
Regarding the first hypothesis (H1), which predicts a positive influence of the concentration 
on the occurrence of an ED contract, our results suggest a reverse relationship. More precisely, 
when the subsectors are taken into account, we find that the size of the market segment is 
positively related to the likelihood of ED.As the size of the market segment indicates the number 
of upstream firms within a subsector of the sample, the result suggests a positive relationship 
between the number of upstream firms and the likelihood of ED. Hence, the hypothesis H1, in 
which anti-competitive ED is more likely to occur for more concentrated upstream industries, 
does not hold. In other words, the French distribution data do not support the anti-competitive 
rationale that ED is used by dominant upstream firms to foreclose the trade of potential 
competitors with downstream retailers. Therefore, our results provide evidence that the ED 
contract used in the French distribution network is mainly for the purpose of improving 
efficiency. Indeed, as suggested in Kitamura (2010), “if ED is signed in industries with many 
alternative factor inputs, products and technologies, then it is likely to be signed for efficiency 
reasons”. 
Our empirical findings regarding H1 are complemented and enhanced by the results 
concerning the geographical location of the upstream units. To understand explain the impact of 
the geographical dimension and, more precisely, the positive influence of the location in the 
capital city on the choice to use ED, we suspect a link between geographical features and the 
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level of upstream competition. Simple statistics as those provided in Appendix 2 confirm this 
relationship. First, we see that the number of networks with an upstream unit located in the 
capital city is higher (Table 15). Considering the empirical finding that when the upstream unit is 
located in the capital city the likelihood for ED is higher, the results suggests that the upstream 
competition level positively impacts the choice for ED, which is contrary to the anti-competitive 
argument. To study the robustness of the link between the geographical location and the level of 
competition, we perform Pearson chi-square tests between the location of the upstream unit and 
several competition variables. All results clearly show that the hypothesis of independence must 
be rejected. In other words, whatever the competition criteria (number of units, networks or 
outlets in the sector or the segment, etc.), there is a statistical dependence between the location of 
the upstream unit and the level of competition (Table 16). 
Regarding downstream competition, we do not find evidence that the number of downstream 
units for each network (intra-brand downstream competition) or for each market (intra- and 
inter-brand downstream competition) impact the choice for ED (H2a). However, our empirical 
results in models 4, 5, 6, 7 and 10 suggest that the more substitutable the products, the lower the 
probability of observing ED, which is precisely the reverse of H2b. Analogous to the analysis of 
the upstream competition, when the downstream competition is taken into account, our results 
do not support the anti-competitive motive of using ED, a finding that is consistent with 
Simpson and Wickelgren (2007), Wright (2009), etc. 5  Thus, it appears that in the French 
distribution system, ED is used neither to exploit contract externality of buyers when buyers are 
difficult to coordinate (i.e., retailers are numerous), nor to restore monopoly power when 
intensive downstream competition squeezes the vertical industry profit.  
In addition, our results provide empirical support for H3a regarding the positive relationship 
of the upstream complementary investments and the likelihood of observing ED. The results 
show that the upstream substitutable investments also relate positively to the choice for ED. This 
last result is contrary to H3b. Finally, we do not find evidence for hypotheses H4a and H4b, 
which are related to the downstream investments. 
To summarise, it appears that only upstream investments, whether they are complementary or 
substitutable, impact the choice for ED. In both cases, we find evidence that the more the 
upstream firm invests in the vertical relationship, the more likely the firm is to sign ED contracts 
                                                
5 Noting that Fumagalli and Motta (2006) and (2008) suggest that the anti-competitive ED is more likely to occur if 
downstream products are substitutable. However, their analysis is based on the assumption of harsh, Bertrand-like 
downstream competition in which buyers are driven out of the market if they bear higher wholesale prices from the 
less efficient incumbent. This assumption seems to be less consistent with the French distribution network, as many 
retail stores are horizontally differentiated and are not easily driven out if their competitors have cheaper supply 
sources.  
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with downstream retailers. This result suggests that the suppliers do not distinguish between the 
different types of investments and that they tend to impose more restrictive contractual clauses 
because their level of involvement in the vertical relationship is higher. 
The efficiency motive of ED finds strong support when we take into account the nature of 
the investment. The fact that both complementary and substitutable investments by upstream 
suppliers are positively related with the adoption of an ED contract suggests that ED can be used 
to foster the upstream investment. As investigated by Segal and Whinston (2000b), the upstream 
complementary investments, such as efforts for training the downstream staffs and the 
transmission of knowledge, also benefit the trade between retailers and competitors. Therefore, 
ED can be used to protect the investment from free-riding by the upstream competitors. In this 
case, ED is efficiency improving. A similar explanation can also be found in Besanko and Perry 
(1993), where investment has a positive inter-brand externality to the competitor’s chain.  
However, when the upstream investment is substitutable, in that it reduces the value of trade 
between the retailers and the upstream competitors, Segal and Whinston (2000b) find that the 
investment incentive of the supplier tends to be higher in the absence of ED, as the exclusive 
contract can worsen the position of the upstream competitors with investments. This rationale is 
obviously anti-competitive. However, as our empirical finding regardingH3b suggests a reverse 
result, it again appears that the anti-competitive rationale for ED does not hold in the French 
case. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper investigates the rationales of ED, which is one of the most common forms of vertical 
restraint, in attracting intense policy debates in anti-trust regulations. Based on a survey of the 
theoretical literature, we identify the determinants that may result in this contractual arrangement 
for anti-competitive and pro-competitive reasons. In particular, we consider the industry features, 
such as the upstream and downstream competition, as well as the nature of the investments 
undertaken in the vertical relationship. Several hypotheses are derived from the theoretical 
framework and tested using French data from several types of distribution networks in a wide 
range of sectors.   
The results highlight the good explanatory power of the estimated probit models (good fit 
statistics). These results are robust and suggest that taking into account the market structure and 
the upstream and downstream investment nature, ED contracts are primarily used for pro-
competitive reasons in the French distribution system. More precisely, we find that contrary to 
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the theoretical prediction regarding the anti-competitive rationales of ED, the larger the number 
of upstream firms within a subsector of the sample, the more likely these firms are to reach ED 
agreements with downstream retailers. Meanwhile, there is no evidence that the number of 
downstream units for each network (intra-brand downstream competition) or for each market 
(intra- and inter-brand downstream competition) affects the choice for ED. Instead, we find that 
the more substitutable the final products are, the more likely it is that there will be ED contracts. 
Therefore, it appears that in the French distribution networks, ED is used neither to exploit 
contract externality of buyers when buyers are difficult to coordinate (i.e.. when retailers are 
numerous) nor to restore the monopoly power when intensive downstream competition squeezes 
the vertical industry profit.  
It seems that the motivation for ED is primarily the result of its positive role in fostering the 
investment of the upstream firms. Indeed, we find that the more the upstream firms invest in the 
vertical relationship, the more likely that they sign ED contracts, a finding that corresponds to 
the theoretical prediction on the efficient motive of ED (Segal and Whinston 2000b, Besanko 
and Perry 1993): the upstream investments, such as efforts for training the downstream staffs and 
the transmission of expertise, also benefit the trade between retailers and competitors. Therefore, 
ED can be used to protect the investment from the free-riding of the upstream competitors.  
Our empirical results provide interesting insights for competition authorities. The traditional 
regulation of the competition agencies is usually hostile towards ED agreements. As noted by 
Motta et al. (2012), “The decisions in cases involving ED are often controversial as the 
promotion of relation-specific investment must be balanced against the threat of foreclosure of 
potential competitors”. Our results suggest that when an industry or a sector is taken into 
account, ED exhibits a pro-competitive nature in promoting the relation-specific investment, 
rather than enhancing the dominant position of the incumbent. The reason can stem from two 
facts. On the one hand, our results may suggest that the competition authority has successfully 
blocked the anti-competitive ED, leaving the pro-efficiency ED prevailing in the industry. On the 
other hand, the results may imply that the studied industry structures and the market 
environments are unfavourable for anti-competitive ED. This second interpretation of our 
empirical findings is consistent with the critics of the Chicago School (Bork, 1978 and Posner, 
1976) who contend the incumbent would not find it profitable to sign an anti-competitive ED 
contract and to pay buyers not to address the efficient entrant.  
As the first explanation raises a problem of selection bias, future studies in this direction 
would be interesting. Other limits of this paper include the definition of the dummy variable 
capturing the product level of substitution and the identification of the nature of the investments, 
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which may be not well specified. Here, again, complementary empirical results would be useful in 
dealing with such variables. 
Finally, our results regarding the control variables open interesting avenues for further study.  
While the age and the type of the network have no influence on the choice to include an ED 
clause, a strong influence of the geographical location of the upstream firm must be noted. This 
is an unexplored, yet interesting, dimension of the contractual choices, and the result is robust in 
this respect. Thus, the choice to impose ED differs regarding the location of the upstream unit, 
with a main distinction between the capital city area and the rest of the country. The statistical 
link between the geographical location and the level of the upstream competition, as highlighted 
in the paper, is a first step in the explanation. The impact of the geographical dimension on the 
contractual design and, more broadly, on the organisational choices in distribution networks 
appears as a new and interesting direction for future research. 
In addition, our estimations highlight also the strong influence of the other vertical restraints 
(exclusive territory, tying) on the choice to impose ED. Regarding this issue, we control for 
endogeneity bias with Hausman tests comparing probit and bivariate probit models fitted to 
binary endogenous regressors. The estimated positive influence provides evidence of the 
complementarity between the vertical restraints, thus suggesting that the three studied provisions 
(ED, tying, exclusive territory) can be considered a “package”. This result also calls for further 
empirical research regarding the interactions between the vertical restraints used in distribution 
contracts. 
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Appendix 1. 
 
Table 14. Variance inflation factors 
 
   Variable   VIF  
SIZEMARKET 4.72     
SIZESEGMENT 4.20     
HHI 3.16     
MARKETSHARE 2.91     
MARKSHARHHI 2.50     
SUBSTITUTE 2.01     
TRANSF 1.68     
INITRAIN 1.66     
UPSUBSTI 1.40     
SOUTHWEST 1.34     
DOWNSUBSTI 1.33     
NORTHWEST 1.33     
SOUTHEAST 1.30     
TYING 1.27     
TYPENET 1.26     
NORTHEAST 1.23     
SERVICE 1.22     
EXCLUTERRI 1.21     
SIZENET 1.17     
AGE 1.15     
OTHERNET 1.11     
  Mean VIF                                    1.86
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Appendix 2. 
 
 
Figure 1. Visual abstract of the framework 
French data (INSEE) 
15 markets ie sectors, enclosing 25 segments (INSEE classifications) 
 
On each market: 
 
 
Upstream  
Competing 
firms 
(Suppliers - S)                      
 
 
 
 
 
                           S signs ED 
 
 
Downstream firms 
competing 
(Retailers) 
 
 
Upstream iner-brand competition 
Downstream inter & intra brand competition 
Final consumer not taken into account in the data 
 
 
Network = one upstream unit in addition with several retailers using a common brand.  
 
Upstream unit: 
 
ü defines and promotes the brand name 
ü supplier 
 
234 networks with ED 
270 networks without ED 
 
Without ED each downstream unit using the brand name of A can deal in the same time with B. 
 
Research questions: 
       Why include ED in distribution contracts? Anti or pro competitive motivation? 
 
 
  
B A  
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Appendix 3. 
 
 
Table 15. Geographical distribution of the networks 
 
 
Location of the upstream unit 
 
 
Number of networks 
Capital city 209 
Southeast 93 
Southwest 63 
Northeast 60 
Northwest 79 
 
 
 
 
Table 16. Pearson chi-square tests 
between the location of the upstream unit and competition variables 
 
 
Variable 1. 
Location of the 
upstream unit* 
 
Variable 2. 
Competition variable 
 
Pearson chi-square tests** 
 
MARKET 
Number of networks - 15 markets 
  
 
Pearson chi2(44) =  97.0215Pr = 0.000 
 
SIZESEGMENT                                              
Number of networks – 25 segments 
 
 
 
Pearson chi2 (88) = 164.5566   Pr = 0.000 
       
Interactive variable: MARKET * SIZESEGMENT 
 
 
Pearson chi2 (120) = 191.2780   Pr = 0.000 
 
SIZEMARKET 
Number of downstream units – 15 markets  
 
 
Pearson chi2(56) = 120.1059   Pr = 0.000   
 
* 5 alternatives: Capital city, Southeast, Southwest, Northeast, Northwest. 
** The null hypothesis H0 is the hypothesis of independence between variable 1 & variable 2. 
This hypothesis is rejected in all the cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
